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1. Introduction 
 
 This article develops a set of recommendations for the psychiatric and medical community 
in the treatment of mental disorders in response to the recently published fifth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, i.e., DSM-5. We focus primarily on the 
limitations of the DSM-5 in its individuation of complicated grief, which can be diagnosed as 
Major Depression under its new criteria, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). We argue 
that the hyponarrativity of the descriptions of these disorders in the DSM-5, defined as the 
abstraction of the illness categories from the particular life contingencies and personal identity of 
the patient (e.g., age, race, gender, socio-economic status), constrains the DSM-5’s usefulness in 
the development of psychotherapeutic approaches in the treatment of mental disorders. While the 
DSM-5 is useful in some scientific and administrative contexts, the DSM’s hyponarrativity is 
problematic, we argue, given that the DSMs are designed to be useful guides for not only 
scientific research, but also for the education of medical practitioners and for treatment 
development. Our goal therefore is to offer suggestions for mental health practitioners in using 
the DSM-5, so that they can avoid/eliminate the problems that may stem from the limitations of 
hyponarrativity. When such problems are eliminated we believe that effective psychotherapeutic 
strategies can be developed, which would be successful in repairing the very relationships that 
are strained in mental disorder: the patient’s relationship to herself, her physical environment, 
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and her social environment.  
 
2. Hyponarrativity in the DSM-5 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) offers the standard 
criteria for the classification of mental disorders. It is designed for pragmatic use across a variety 
of settings to accomplish a plethora of tasks: to facilitate clinical treatment, to develop 
educational programs about mental illness, to provide clear criteria of eligibility for various 
administrative and policy related purposes, including the determination of insurance coverage 
and disability aid, to further scientific research into mental disorder etiology, 
psychopharmacology, and forensics.i It is thus used to meet the needs and serve the interests of a 
variety of stakeholders, including patients and their families, researchers, clinicians, educators, 
pharmaceutical companies, and insurance companies. The manual is regularly revised and the 
criteria for mental disorders are adjusted to reflect the level of knowledge about mental disorders 
and their treatment as science progresses. So far, the manual has five editions, and there are 
ongoing conversations on a revision of the DSM-5.  
 The DSM-5 lists the criteria for mental disorders according to observable and 
scientifically measurable symptoms (experienced by the patient) and signs (observed by others). 
Polythetic criteria sets, as opposed to monothetic criteria sets, are used to determine the 
boundaries of a disorder category. Monothetic classifications are based on the characteristics that 
are both necessary and sufficient for the identification of members of a class; each member of a 
class must have at least one property shared with all members of the class. In polythetic 
classifications, each individual member of a class shares a large proportion of its properties with 
other members but all members do not necessarily share any one property.ii For instance, 
according to the criteria for depression in the DSM-5, at least five symptoms have to be present 
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during a two-week period and must represent a change from the patient’s previous functioning: 
either “depressed mood” or “diminished interest in and pleasure from daily activities” must be 
among the five. Additional symptoms include: significant weight loss or gain; insomnia or 
hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation; fatigue or loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or 
inappropriate guilt; and diminished ability to think or concentrate, indecisiveness, recurrent 
thoughts of death, and suicidal ideation (DSM-5 2013, 125).  
The symptom-based classification of mental disorders (also called the descriptive 
approach) was adopted in the DSM-III (1980) and guided both the DSM-IV (1994) and the 
recently published DSM-5 (2013). The development of this approach was an expression of 
psychiatry’s move towards an evidence based scientific framework, away from the etiological 
approaches of the DSM-I (1952) and the DSM-II (1968). These earlier approaches relied on 
empirically undefended theoretical assumptions about the workings of the mind, rather than 
outwardly observable correlates of disease.  Mental disorders, also called “reactions,” in these 
manuals, were represented in relation to the causal factors thought to underlie them.iii These 
causal factors were described in the framework of psychoanalysis and taken either as a 
dysfunction in the brain or a general adaptational difficulty to environmental stressors due to 
unresolved sexual conflicts of childhood.  
A symptom-based approach replaced this framework in the DSM-III, because clusters of 
symptoms and signs, by virtue of their observability and measurability, were thought to facilitate 
objective scientific research and reliable clinical diagnosis. A scientifically valid category of 
mental disorder requires external validators, such as symptoms, and signs, not simply theories.iv 
Thus, symptom and sign clusters were resourceful constructs for scientists whose goal was to 
better investigate the neurological and genetic underpinnings of mental illness.v From the clinical 
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perspective, these “consensus-based lists” of criteria afforded clinicians a sense of certainty in an 
area of medicine where no physiological tests are plausible.vi Finally, symptoms and signs, by 
virtue of being empirically validated, allow diagnostic categories to be reliably and consistently 
used across clinical settings, thereby establishing a “shared discourse in the presence of 
competing and incompatible theoretical and etiological assumptions about mental disorders.”vii 
As stated in the DSM-III, through a descriptivist approach, “clinicians can agree on the 
identification of mental disorders on the basis of their clinical manifestations without agreeing on 
how the disturbances come about.”viii  
 One significant disadvantage of operationalizing a symptom-based approach is the level 
of abstraction in the individuation of mental disorders.ix Specifically, the symptom clusters fail to 
represent certain complexities of the encounter with mental disorder which are neither 
immediately observable nor readily measurable. In a mental disorder experience, the individual’s 
relationship with herself, her physical environment, and her social environment is strained or 
severed, adding many layers of complexities to the encounter with mental disorders. These 
include the developmental trajectory of mental disorder in the individual from childhood to 
adulthood; the individual’s particular life history; interpersonal relationships; biological and 
environmental risk factors; gender, race, class, and status; the first-person-specific dimension of 
the symptoms, such as what the individual hears when she hears voices; and the meaning the 
individual ascribes to these elements of life in her socio-cultural context. Philosopher and 
psychiatrist John Sadler has called this feature of the DSM “hyponarrativity,” which means that 
the disorder category is abstracted from particular experiences, contingencies of the individual 
patient and her social context.x As discussed in detail below, the DSM categories, by virtue of 
highlighting symptoms, abstract (or bracket) the self-related and context-specific aspects of the 
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encounter with mental disorders.xi By saying little about how the disorder experience is 
integrated into the patient’s life as a whole, the categories are simply a “repertoire of 
behaviour.”xii  
 In the scientific research of mental disorders this sort of abstraction is necessary in order 
to isolate particular disorder signs and symptoms for study. Bracketing the narrative elements of 
the disorder experience is thus not a limitation but an essential feature of the scientific study of 
mental disorders. Likewise, generalization is necessary for the administration of medical 
practice, notably in coding and billing. We thus limit the scope of this paper to the DSM’s 
limitations in clinical practice, defined here as the one-on-one diagnostic and treatment 
encounters between medical practitioners and patients. In this description of clinical practice, 
medical practitioners include (but are not limited to) nurse practitioners, physician assistants, 
family doctors and psychiatrists. We highlight the hyponarrativity of the DSM-5 in two cases:  
complicated grief and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). More specifically, we argue the 
DSM-5 is has limitations stemming from this hyponarrativity in the development of effective 
psychotherapy methods because it abstracts away the important features of individual 
experiences, and these may be crucial for the clinician to acknowledge and engage with, if he is 
to restore the patient’s relationship to herself and her social and physical world, thereby 
achieving therapeutic improvement.  
 
3. Complicated Grief  
 Grief is a complex emotional, physical, cognitive, behavioural, and social response to the 
loss of someone with whom a meaningful connection has been established.xiii  Grief is a 
ubiquitous human experience, but takes many shapes. Some feel the pain of loss intensely at 
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first, grieve for a period of time, and then gradually adjust. Some welcome support from friends, 
relatives, or religious advisors; others rely on their own cognitive and emotional resources. A 
few may feel stuck in grief, even though a significant period of time has passed and they have 
received various kinds of support. These individuals may consult clinicians for assistance. This is 
termed “complicated” or “prolonged” grief by medical practitioners and is the focus of this 
section.  
The DSM-5 enables a clinician to diagnose an individual encountering complicated grief 
as having major depressive disorder (henceforth depression).xiv This is because, arguably, there 
are significant overlaps between symptoms and signs of depression, and the experiences of those 
experiencing complicated grief. In our view, folding complicated grief into depression does not 
facilitate the development of psychotherapeutic approaches to clinically address complicated 
grief. This is problematic, we argue, because the DSM manual is intended to be used to further 
research in mental disorder etiology and also to guide clinical treatment and psychopathology 
education.xv  
We start with an overview of the characteristics of complicated grief: mourning the 
deceased, mourning the self, and mourning the lost relationship. We then consider the evolution 
of scientific psychiatry’s approach to complicated grief, and point out the disjunction between 
complicated grief experience and its symptom-based individuation in the DSM. Then, citing 
evidence of the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic interventions in addressing grief, we discuss 
why the DSM-5’s characterization of grief does not provide resources for the development of 
such interventions.  
 
3.1 Characteristics of Complicated Grief 
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 Complicated or prolonged grief is marked by a pattern of persistent and elevated distress 
following a loss.xvi It includes mourning (i) the deceased, (ii) the self, and (iii) the sudden loss of 
a significant relationship.xvii  
(i) First, the individual will be distressed about the loss of an inherently and 
independently valuable person who can no longer participate in life or complete his planned 
projects. Let us call this the other-related aspect of grief. The individual experiences intense 
longing and yearning for the deceased; her daily life is interrupted by intrusive thoughts and 
images involving, for instance, something the deceased had said prior to his death, or the death 
scene itself. Further, she may avoid places and situations that remind her of the deceased or react 
excessively to cues that evoke him.xviii To escape these experiences, the individual must 
recognize and negotiate the fact that the deceased will not be returning and his projects will 
remain incomplete. 
(ii) Second, the individual mourns the loss of a significant aspect of herself. Let us call 
this the self-related aspect of grief. As philosophers and psychologists have long argued, the self 
is not an autonomous entity disengaged from its social, and cultural world, but an inter-
subjective entity constituted by and defined in its relationships to others.xix This means that, as 
Lorraine Code puts it, persons are “second persons” who only become persons in relation with 
others.xx This posits both a causal and constitutional relationship between the self and others. 
Causally speaking, others influence what becomes of the self when one is exposed to different 
acculturations and social contexts. For instance, the individual can form an identity as a soccer 
player in contexts where she develops her skills as a soccer player. Among other things, she will 
need a coach and a group to practice with, and a cultural context where such practice is 
recognized and respected. Another causal example is the development of self-regarding attitudes; 
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for instance, self-respect is typically gained and sustained in ongoing and mutually supportive 
interpersonal relations.xxi The individual’s sex, gender, age, race, and class are important as well, 
as they all have a direct causal influence on what she becomes. Individuals are also 
constitutionally relational/inter-subjective because their identities include elements of the social 
context in which they are embedded. For instance, the identity of a person as an immigrant is 
constituted in a context where she is eligible to live in a country she is not born in.  
 Considered within a relational framework, then, grieving the loss of a loved one involves 
grieving for a lost part of the self. As William James suggests, a person’s self includes “not only 
his body and his psychic powers, but… his wife and children, his ancestors and friends… and if 
they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down.”xxii The individual loses some of the self-
regarding attitudes generated by the loved one. For example, her self-concept as a daughter 
changes when her father is no longer alive.  The grieving individual feels a sense of emptiness or 
emotional numbness following loss, possibly experiencing self-directed anger or guilt related to 
the loss and lacking life aspirations.xxiii She stops engaging with previously enjoyed activities.  
The more the individual’s identity is enmeshed with the deceased, the more difficult it will be to 
adjust to the loss and redesign her life. She must salvage her identity and continue without the 
loved one in her life. 
 (iii) Finally, complicated grief includes mourning the loss of a valuable relationship. The 
relationship-related aspect of grief is expressed in various forms. For instance, the individual 
may avoid being in environments where she and the deceased enjoyed joint activities (e.g., tennis 
courts). An adolescent who loses his father with whom he had a strong relationship may have 
difficulty connecting to other members of his family and may avoid being in spaces with others.  
A middle- aged woman who mourns the death of her abusive husband may have to revisit and 
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cope with abuse related issues before she can accept and cope with the death itself. In all these 
relationship related issues, closure is recommended for the individual to move forward.xxiv  
 
3.2 Scientific Psychiatry and the Bereavement Exclusion 
 Complicated grief has long puzzled medical practitioners. It has been a challenge to 
develop a standardized therapeutic approach because of the cultural, social, and individual 
diversities in how grief is encountered; but since the late 1970s, the creators of the DSM have 
entertained the possibility that complicated grief may be individuated as a distinct disease 
category. Under DSM’s descriptive framework, significant similarities are evident between the 
observable experiences of complicated grief and the symptoms and signs of depression, 
including sadness, sleep disruptions, changes in appetite, fatigue, diminished interest or pleasure 
in previously enjoyed activities, and difficulties in concentration, giving birth to the idea that 
complicated grief can be individuated as a kind of depression.xxv At this point, the remaining 
challenge for medical practitioners was to distinguish the cases in which experiences of grieving 
individuals were within the range of appropriate responses to loss from those in which 
individuals were experiencing complicated grief, a precursor to fully developed depression.  
To avoid a possible false positive problem in the clinical context, where the distress 
associated with appropriate grief could yield a misdiagnosis of the grieving individual’s 
condition as depression, the psychiatric community introduced the bereavement exclusion 
criterion into the depression diagnostic criteria.xxvi More specifically, the DSM-III stated that if 
the depression-like symptoms of the individual in grief exceeded one year, a depression 
diagnosis could be made and the individual could receive appropriate treatment. In the DSM-IV, 
the length of appropriate grieving was reduced to two months. In the DSM-5, the bereavement 
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exclusion criterion has been removed, based on the assumption that grief related distress and 
depression are not distinct. Clinicians can now diagnose individuals with depression if their grief 
is manifest in experiences resembling the symptoms of depression, as early as two weeks after 
the loss – the required time for those with depression symptoms to receive a clinical diagnosis.  
 The rationale for removing the bereavement exclusion is that there is no scientific 
evidence for characterizing bereavement related distress and depression as distinct conditions; 
hence, whatever treatment helps the latter will also help the former.xxvii Proponents of this change 
in the DSM-5 further argue that if those struggling with grief are not diagnosed with depression, 
they will not receive clinical support even if they need it. The Chair of the DSM-5 Task Force, 
psychiatrist David Kupfer, argues that without the change, a person suffering from severe 
depression symptoms one or two months after a loss can’t be diagnosed as depressed and “may 
then not get the treatment they need.”xxviii Some even propose an increased risk of suicide among 
those suffering from bereavement-related distress and highlight the importance of early 
intervention.xxix 
 Now consider the DSM-5’s individuation of major depression, which, with the removal 
of the bereavement exclusion criterion, is expected to guide the clinician to address complicated 
grief. According to the depression criteria listed in it, at least five symptoms have to be present 
during a two-week period and must represent a change from the patient’s previous functioning: 
either “depressed mood” or “diminished interest in and pleasure from daily activities” must be 
among the five. Additional symptoms include: significant weight loss or gain; insomnia or 
hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation; fatigue or loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or 
inappropriate guilt; diminished ability to think or concentrate, indecisiveness, recurrent thoughts 
of death, and suicidal ideation.xxx To prevent misdiagnosis, if the symptoms are accounted for by 
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the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical condition, a depression 
diagnosis cannot be made.xxxi As of yet we have not noticed any research conducted on whether 
the removal of bereavement exclusion has caused an increase in depression diagnosis and 
treatment, however, it would be interesting and important to pursue such investigation. 
 
3.3 Major Depression as a Construct for Complicated Grief 
 Simply stated, while an individual with complicated grief may manifest depressive 
symptoms, engaging with and addressing these symptoms alone will not automatically remedy 
the distressing feelings involved in her loss (i.e., mourning the deceased, the self, and the 
relationship). The DSM-5 framework, by directing the clinician’s attention to managing 
symptoms individually, as opposed to engaging with the three aspects of grief simultaneously, 
fails to offer resources likely to address complicated grief. We can easily imagine scenarios in 
which the overworked family doctor, within the 15 minutes allotted for each patient, may 
diagnose a grieving individual with depression, basing his diagnosis on the similarity of the 
complaints to the symptoms of depression and failing to recognize that the underlying stressor of 
those complaints is the loss of a loved one.  
Thus, by slotting grief under depression, the DSM-5 erases the therapeutic import of 
distinguishing the two. It does not actively guide the clinician to engage with the personal details 
of the individual’s particular loss. In addition, given that the DSMs are used for teaching 
purposes in medical schools, the more symptom-oriented the mental disorder descriptions are, 
the less likely it will be for psychiatry residents to receive special training in psychotherapy and 
other narrative treatment techniques, as the symptom-management approach lends itself naturally 
to a medication-based treatment strategy.  
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3.4 Psychotherapeutic Approaches to Complicated Grief 
 Interestingly, some psychotherapeutic approaches effectively address complicated grief 
by targeting the self, the deceased, and the relationship-related aspects of grief. For example, 
cognitive–behavioral therapy and interpersonal therapy techniques are efficacious in 
ameliorating the symptoms of prolonged grief, especially for those experiencing heightened 
distress following loss.xxxii The common denominator of these therapies is targeting the above 
mentioned aspects of grief and addressing the needs stemming from these dimensions. In such 
psychotherapeutic approaches, the primary goals are to establish a strong therapeutic alliance 
with the grieving individual, to obtain a history of her interpersonal relationships and 
interpersonal history, including early family relationships, other losses, her relationship with the 
deceased, the story of the death, and current relationships. The therapist and individual discuss 
the latter’s current life situation, including stressors and coping resources. 
 In the self-related aspect of grief, the age, race, and gender of the griever, as well as the 
level of distress encountered, are important determinants of psychotherapeutic treatment. With 
small children, for instance, psychotherapy tends to focus on understanding and highlighting the 
place and meaning of the deceased individual in the child’s life and asks whether the child has 
other individuals in her life who might give her similar support. The therapist tries to understand 
the child as an individual, seeking to identify her dreams, aspirations and support system; she 
develops an approach that suits these needs. In building a therapeutic alliance with the child, the 
therapist earns the child’s trust and helps her create a different kind of relationship with the 
deceased. The treatment also involves focusing on the child’s personal goals and 
relationships.xxxiii Early intervention is associated with greater efficacy.xxxiv  
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For the other-related and relationship-related aspects of grief, most methods employ some 
form of cognitive restructuring and exposure. Cognitive restructuring techniques help the griever 
come to terms with the death of the deceased, for instance, following suicide, and to revise her 
understanding of him. Exposure techniques typically involve retelling the story of the loss or 
confronting avoidance of places or people associated with the loss. The interventions target both 
the experience of loss (using exposure and restructuring techniques) and restorative processes 
(goal setting and improved relationships).xxxv While some of these treatment strategies (e.g., goal 
setting) are also used in depression, methods such as exposure and restructuring are used 
exclusively to treat patients who encountered grief and/or traumatic event. Hence, it is not 
correct to assume that treatment strategies effective in depression are also effective in addressing 
grief. 
 
4. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has a complicated social and scientific history. 
As we will discuss below, the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III in 1980 was motivated and 
complicated by political concerns surrounding a diverse community of trauma survivors. 
Scientifically, PTSD is one of the disorder symptom-clusters in the DSM that retains an 
etiological descriptor in addition to symptom and sign descriptions.xxxvi More specifically, the 
PTSD diagnosis requires the existence of a traumatic stressor (either a singular traumatic event, 
or exposure to trauma consistently over time), which is deemed to be the cause of the symptoms 
of intrusion, avoidance, negative alterations in cognition or mood, and hyperarousal.xxxvii PTSD 
is a complicated diagnostic category for several reasons.  First, quality of the traumatic stressor 
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symptoms while another does not. For example, suppose two persons are involved in an 
automobile accident, and further suppose that the first individual had suffered the loss of her 
father from a car accident during her youth and the second has no trauma associated with 
automobiles. The first person could develop PTSD symptoms as a result of the event while the 
second may not. This points to, as we discuss below, the fact that for an event to be traumatic for 
an individual, elements of the individual’s history, psychology, and social location are important. 
Second, the symptoms of avoidance and negative alterations in cognition and mood may be 
present prior to traumatic exposure for members of groups who face social threat situations of 
violence more than others.xxxviii  As we explain below, women, people of color, LGBTQ and trans 
persons face violence and the threat of violence at higher rates than others, and thus have 
different orientations to the social world even absent exposure to a traumatic event personally.  
 In this section, we show that the self-related and gender-related dimensions of trauma 
experience are missing in the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The DSM-5 does acknowledge that 
females are more likely to experience PTSD than males due to greater exposure to rape and 
interpersonal violence, but it leaves unrecognized the importance of the context in which 
individuals experience violence and the factors that contribute to individuals’ defining a 
particular action or event as violence. When trauma is addressed clinically, however, the 
therapist must recognize and engage with these details. Thus, the DSM-5 does not provide useful 
resources for the therapeutic addressing of PTSD. 
 
4.1 Evolution of PTSD in the DSM 
 The current understanding of psychological trauma and PTSD is rooted in late 
nineteenth-century psychological typing of hysteria and early twentieth-century studies of World 
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War I combat survivors.xxxix The first scientific study of hysteria was conducted in the late 
nineteenth century, by Jean-Martin Charcot, who documented what appeared to him as 
neurological symptoms: motor paralysis, sensory losses, convulsions and amnesia.xl Twenty 
years later, Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud (working separately) found the neurological 
responses catalogued by Charcot were caused by underlying psychological trauma, which, when 
triggered, produced an altered state of consciousness—“dissociation” for Janet and “double 
consciousness” for Freud—which, in turn, resulted in the neurological symptoms catalogued by 
Charcot. Following the First World War, it was noted that returning soldiers began to “act like 
hysterical women”: weeping uncontrollably, experiencing dissociation, aphasia, memory loss 
and emotional numbness. 
 Although the similarities between the symptoms and signs of hysteria and the experiences 
of combat veterans were significant and striking, there was resistance to associating “brave” 
combat veterans with “hysterical women.”  One response was the valorization of those who did 
not suffer psychological trauma after combat: simply stated, soldiers of strong moral character 
did not experience the aftermath of war in this way. Accordingly, those who did were 
diagnostically grouped with women with hysteria and thought to have weak moral character.  
After the Second World War, the thinking changed; veterans suffering psychological trauma 
related to combat exposure were dissociated from hysterical women.  Military psychiatrists 
found that any man could suffer psychological trauma in proportion to the severity of exposure 
to combat, and  “combat neurosis” became a legitimate and predictable effect of combat 
exposure. Systematic, large-scale investigations of combat neurosis and its long-term 
psychological effects began after the Vietnam War.xli Vietnam veterans were at the forefront of a 
social movement that brought unprecedented scientific attention to the psychological trauma of 
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combat.  For example, they organized “rap groups” that offered solace to those suffering 
psychological trauma and raised awareness about the psychological effects of war.  The 
movement was taken up by the Veteran’s Administration, which commissioned a comprehensive 
study on the long-term effects of combat exposure.  These efforts brought this type of trauma to 
the attention of the medical profession. In 1980, for the first time, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) was individuated through a symptom and sign cluster and entered the DSM-III as a 
mental disorder.  
 
4.2 The Limitations of The Stressor Criterion  
 In the DSM-5, PTSD is recategorized as a trauma- or stressor-related disorder rather than 
an anxiety or fear disorder.xlii This new categorization affirms the importance of the traumatic 
event or traumatic exposure as an etiological instigator of the symptoms that follow: intrusion, 
avoidance, negative alterations in cognition or mood, and hyperarousal. We argue that traumatic 
exposure, as described in the DSM-5, limits the understanding of PTSD because it primarily 
requires the existence of (i) the traumatic stressor(s) themselves, however neglects (ii) the 
narrative elements of the self that contribute to an individual experiencing an event as traumatic, 
which lead to the unique presentation of the PTSD symptoms in individual sufferers. Given that 
the DSM criteria guide not only the diagnostic process but also the treatment process, we believe 
that it is crucial to engage with  (ii), as these have therapeutic import in the clinic. 
 Consider the stressor criterion (traumatic exposure) that underlies the etiology of PTSD:  
 “A: Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, sexual violence in one  (or 
more) of the following ways:  
 
1. Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s) 
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to others.  
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3. Learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a close family member or close 
friend. In cases of actual or threatened death of a family member or friend, the 
event(s) must have been violent or accidental.  
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic 
event(s) (e.g., first responders collecting human remains; police officers 
repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse).”xliii  
 
In addition to being the victim or intended victim of violence, assault, or injury, witnessing an 
event, learning of an event, and repeated exposure to the aftermath of traumatic events are 
included as putative causes. Some suggest the broader scope could weaken PTSD as a viable 
diagnostic category.xliv Our concern here is not the broadness of the exposure criterion but the 
oversight of the recognition of (ii) the narrative elements of the self that contribute to an 
individual experiencing an event as traumatic. The characteristics of a traumatic event have less 
to do with PTSD symptom presentation than do the psychological characteristics of the 
individual and her sensitivity, or vulnerability to trauma.  
Recall the example of the automobile accident mentioned above: the person who had 
suffered an important loss as a result of an automobile accident is more likely to experience acute 
stress disorder or PTSD as a result of an automobile accident than a companion who had not 
suffered such a loss. The former may experience intrusive memories of the prior loss as well as 
the more recent automobile accident; she may avoid traveling by automobile or bus, and areas 
surrounding the event of the accident and even those resembling the area of the accident; she 
may experience new or renewed fears or anxieties or hopelessness; and she may experience 
heightened arousal at the sights or sounds of an automobile backfiring, glass shattering, etc. The 
companion, on the other hand, may react so that she is more aware or vigilant while driving in 
the future, may suffer acute stress reactions, and even avoid travelling by road, but she is less 
likely to experience the range and severity of trauma symptoms as is the first, even if she 
develops PTSD.xlv In short, the first person is already more vulnerable than the companion, and 
 18 
so the threat of death or injury is experienced more acutely, therefore, more traumatically. In 
addressing the needs of these two individuals who suffer from PTSD, the clinician will have to 
pay attention to, and engage with their unique responses, which cannot be isolated from their 
own individual stories and social contexts. As we indicate above and reiterate in the conclusion, 
these individual stories and social contexts are absent from the DSM-5 and because the DSM-5 
is used at least in part as a primary teaching tool for clinicians, sensitivity to such stories and 
contexts may not be developed in clinicians without more extensive psychiatric training. 
 
4.3. The Limitations in the Individuation of  “Violence” 
 We also argue that the concept of “violence” used in the DSM-5 does not recognize 
violence as a relational phenomenon, nor the social factors that contribute to and create the 
background conditions for violence. As we will describe below, some group memberships (e.g., 
gender-based) make one more vulnerable to violence, and this shapes the victim’s perception of 
violence as a socially embedded and embodied person.xlvi Acknowledging, and engaging with the 
individual’s social embeddedness and embodiment, which help to constitute the particular 
meaning of being subject to violence, however, are important for therapeutic improvement in the 
clinic, and thus must be acknowledged in the DSM, if it is to educate and guide clinicians. 
 “Violence” is not explicitly defined in the DSM-5; it is rather used as a generic concept. 
The concept is intrinsically layered, however, as much philosophical work shows.xlvii The DSM-
5’s neglect of these layers make it a poor guide for PTSD treatment. Philosophers have argued 
that the concept of violence is, at its core, physical,xlviii and rests on related notions of force and 
aggression.xlix Many of these arguments take as a central concern what counts as real violence 
over and above what is merely harm or aggression; importantly, they seek to protect the term’s 
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meaningfulness from metaphorical and allegorical extensions that threaten its clarity. The DSM-
5’s individuation of violence represents what Vittorio Bufacchi calls a “minimal” conception of 
violence, because it sets the minimum requirements for an act or event to be defined as a violent 
one.l The problem with a minimal conception of violence is that it misses the social and political 
dimension of our thinking about violence; in particular, it misses that violence describes a social 
relationship rather than simply an act or an event.li The social relationship of particular interest is 
the power relationship between violent actors and their victims. This points to the position of 
vulnerability in which many persons find themselves by virtue of their group membership. lii  
 What is problematic about the absence of a relational account of violence and trauma in 
the DSM-5 is the consequent failure to recognize the psychological and behavioral effects of 
vulnerability. For instance, Criterion C in the DSM-5’s PTSD category requires that traumatic 
exposure or violence cause avoidance of triggering places, persons or things.liii We are concerned 
with the clean temporal order assumed in the connection between the violent event and 
individual’s future reactions. It presumes the social world is neutral for each individual, and the 
traumatic event causes a change in that social world such that some spaces are “safe” and others 
are “dangerous.” This must happen in many cases, but persons whose group membership makes 
them more vulnerable to violence may not experience the world as neutral from the outset. Ann 
Cudd argues that the prevalence of violence based on group membership creates “social threat 
situations” for members of targeted groups.liv Living in a social threat situation decreases 
mobility, increases feelings of disempowerment and reinforces social power dynamics that 
produce vulnerability, violence and traumatic exposure.  
 Criterion D is similar in that it requires that traumatic exposure or violence cause a 
change in cognition and mood, most notably manifesting in negative beliefs and emotional 
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states, as well as alienation from social life.lv The same modifications in behavior experienced in 
social threat situations may already exist for persons living in asymmetrical power relationships 
as a result of their social location.   
   
4.4 Gender and PTSD  
 A significant and overlooked aspect of the self in PTSD is gender location. Gender 
location is absent in the DSMs generally and PTSD classification specifically in two important 
ways. First, the DSMs assume a normal course of psychological development and a normal 
relationship to the world in order to describe disordered or abnormal states or responses. The 
assumed normal relationship to the self and world is historically and stereotypically masculinist, 
while typically feminine traits such as interdependence, emotion, and anxiety are considered as 
signs of abnormality.lvi As Nancy Potter notes, sexual development is an important factor in the 
course of psychological and embodied development; and thus in mental health.lvii For instance, 
young girls’ sexual development is different than young boys, and young girls often experience 
their bodies and selves as ambiguous, paradoxical and discontinuous. These are important factors 
in understanding the individual in the clinical context, however, they are not regarded as 
important factors contributing to the individual’s mental health.   
 Second, vulnerability to traumatic stressors and inculcated sensitivity to trauma are 
directly related to the individual’s social location, specifically, gender, sexual and racial location. 
As we know, women are more vulnerable to sexual violence than men, and trans persons are 
more vulnerable to violence than other queer populations. A 2010 Centers for Disease Control 
Reportlviii estimates that 1 in 6 women experience stalking at some point in their lives in which 
they felt fearful or believed that they or someone close to them would be harmed or killed, while 
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1 in 10 men experienced the same. It is estimated that 1 in 3 women in the United States is a 
victim of intimate partner violence (IPV) while 1 in 10 men is a victim of IPV. Within the latter 
category, 1 in 2 American Indian or Alaskan Native men is a victim of IPV and 2 of 5 Black or 
non-Hispinic minority men are victims. The National Coalition of Anti-violence Programs 
(NCAVP) reports that while hate violence in general has decreased, violence against members of 
the LGBTQH community has increased by 11%. Of those targeted, 87% were people of color, 
and those who identify as transgender were 28% more likely to experience physical violence 
than those who are gender/sex/sexuality normative.lix   
 Persons with these group memberships learn to be sensitive to their surroundings; they 
learn how to avoid situations that might provoke violence, and in the case of women, they often 
present in their bodily comportment signs of weakness and submissiveness to avoid aggressive 
confrontations. Women sit with their legs and arms crossed and heads down in public settings, 
they walk close to buildings rather than street-side on sidewalks, and they alter their speech to 
avoid aggression.lx In addition, an individual’s gendered social location may cause him/her to 
perceive as violent (or potentially violent), and therefore traumatic, events or situations that a 
person at a different gender location may not. Similar to the example of the two persons 
experiencing the automobile accident above, two persons with different gender, sex or sexual 
locations and history may experience the same event differently. While a white, cis-gendered 
male may take cat-calling from the street as a compliment or shrug it off, a woman or trans 
person who is aware of her/his gendered or sexualized vulnerability may experience it as a threat 
to her/his safety.   
 In sum, as discussed in sections 4.2., 4.3., and 4.4., the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD suffer 
from hyponarrativity in the absence of attention to socially significant aspects identity that 
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influence how or whether an individual experiences events as traumatic, which particular aspects 
of their cognition, mood or behavior are altered and how significant these are to the individual 
herself. As we have noted here in the case of PTSD, specifically gendered components of a 
person’s life may complicate both diagnosis and treatment.   To deploy the stressor criterion 
usefully in diagnostic and clinical practice, these self-related and context specific factors must be 
considered. In addition to the complexity of the cognitive structure of the self, clinicians must 
understand the social and political conditions of sexism, racism, homophobia and 
heteronormativity that create social threat situations, that influence behavior and self-concept, 
and that contribute to the likelihood of victimization in order work through, with a patient, the 
traumatic stressor and PTSD symptoms.  
 
4. 5. Psychotherapeutic Approaches to PTSD: Trust and Agency  
 Certain psychotherapeutic approaches engage with the complex dimensions of trauma 
experienced by the individual and are shown to be effective in addressing PTSD. It is widely 
agreed that cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) is the most effective treatment for post-traumatic 
stress disorder.lxi Effective forms of CBT  include psychoeducation, anxiety management, 
exposure therapy and cognitive restructuring.lxii Scholars have also noted the importance of the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship in treatment.lxiii Trust is important for both the patient and 
psychotherapist, as a central component of PTSD is disconnection from others, identified in the 
DSM-5’s criterion D.6 as “detachment” and “estrangement”.lxiv Trust is an issue in all trauma 
and trauma-based psychotherapy because the basic capacities for trust are diminished by 
traumatic exposure and in many instances of trauma, especially sexual violation and childhood 
trauma, dominance and submission are central features of the traumatic event.lxv Loss of trust in 
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others and detachment from others are roadblocks to effective PTSD treatment because for 
psychotherapeutic treatments such as CBT to be effective, the psychotherapist needs important 
information about the patient’s life, the traumatic event and cultural information to determine the 
necessity, scope and dosage for psychotherapeutic treatments.lxvi Further complicating the 
effectiveness of CBT treatment in PTSD, a patient’s socioeconomic class and education level are 
related to a better therapeutic outcome.lxvii  It is established that a psychotherapist must be 
sensitive to these self-related and context specific factors in the patient’s life, which can only be 
gleaned in the context of a strong interpersonal relationship that is itself difficult for a trauma 
patient to enter into.  
 Thus, the first essential component of treatment for trauma is a healing relationship of 
trust.lxviii First, the relationship itself represents a type of treatment or healing because trauma 
victims overwhelmingly experience estrangement and detachment from others. Second, some of 
the basic capacities for interpersonal relationships – trust, autonomy, initiative, identity and 
intimacy – are first formed in relationships, and so must be reformed in relationships post-
trauma.lxix Therapists ought to see psychotherapy as a “cooperative relationship” with clients, an 
arrangement characterized by sharing, wherein therapists recognize the importance and 
limitations of their role and specialized knowledge so that the client can share the narrative 
aspects of his or her life that are essential to effective treatment and recovery.  
 Interestingly, these empirical findings in psychology and psychiatry converge with the 
core arguments developed in feminist scholarship. Feminist philosophers have argued that re-
focusing on the relational elements of the self, and indeed the relational formation of the self, is 
central to the study and understanding of trauma. In particular, they highlight the importance of 
others in the recovery process. The therapeutic recovery process must work through the 
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recognition of the involuntariness of trauma and resultant feelings of lost control.lxx Intrusive 
memories are experienced involuntarily and carry content of extreme vulnerability and possibly 
control by another. They are double reminders of the victim’s vulnerability and powerlessness in 
relation to others.  Re-telling traumatic memories, when they are available, can help victims gain 
more control over “the traces left by trauma.”lxxi Susan Brison expresses it succinctly when she 
writes: 
  Narrative memory is not passively endured; rather, it is an act on the part of the 
 narrator, a speech act that defuses traumatic memory, giving shape and a temporal 
 order to the events recalled, establishing more control over their recalling, and helping 
 the survivor to remake the self” (71). 
 
 Voluntariness counters involuntariness when an individual constructs and gives her 
narrative to another. In this case, the psychotherapist can be a site for voluntary retellings. 
Imagined others can also receive the narrative. Research indicates the therapeutic effectiveness 
of programmed writing, diaries, journaling, autobiography, storytelling, and poetry in 
psychotherapy in the wake of trauma.lxxii The real or figurative presence of an other externalizes 
the narrative which, according to Brison, “temporarily split[s] the self into an active—
narrating—subject and a more passive—described—object.”lxxiii 
 At stake here is the trauma survivor’s sense of her own agency or power in the world. 
Agency and the social compilations of agency tied to the self are not addressed in the DSM-5’s 
PTSD criteria, most likely because agency cannot be operationalized scientifically. Agency, 
however, is a central feature of human life. It can be encouraged in some and diminished in 
others by social forces, and an individual’s sense of her own agency can change as a result of 
traumatic exposure. The involuntariness of the traumatic event itself, the intrusion of traumatic 
memories and unanticipated dissociative states can all cause a trauma victim to question her 
agency or autonomy.  
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 In feminist philosophy, agency has undergone a radical reconceptualization from a self-
centric model to a relational one.lxxiv An individual’s group memberships, cultural traditions and 
personal history all leverage her ability to exercise agency because her sense of what is possible 
is connected to how she defines and views herself in relation to others.lxxv Apart from particular 
traumatic events, persons living in asymmetrical power relationships based on their group 
membership, e.g., women in patriarchal societies, people of color in racist communities, suffer 
what Hilde Nelson calls “damaged identities.” Like Brison, Nelson argues the repair of the 
damaged self occurs through narrative reconstruction. There is a social connection between this 
philosophical theory of damaged identities and the psychological description of PTSD in the 
DSM-5: the group memberships that make individuals vulnerable to violence and traumatic 
exposure are the same memberships that damage identities and therefore agency. Nelson 
proposes the deliberate creation of counter-stories to alter a sub-group member’s self-perception 
as well as the perception of sub-group members in general by a dominant group.  The act of the 
counter-story repairs damaged identity because confronting and challenging a dominant narrative 
is a “purposive act of moral definition.”lxxvi 
 Trust and agency are important aspects of the self, and the recovery from mental disorder, 
aspects on which the DSM is silent. They are interwoven with the individual’s social location: 
race, gender, class, education level, physical ability, nationality, etc. Because they evade 
scientific classification, they require special attention in psychotherapeutic relationships.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
 Our goal in this article has been to identify the context-specific limitations of the DSM-
5’s diagnostic criteria in the clinical setting. We isolate this aspect of the DSM-5’s use because it 
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is a manual that is used for a variety of purposes: insurance coding, scientific research, clinical 
education and treatment development. It is in these last two purposes that the hyponarrativity of 
the DSM-5 can be most problematic. As the examples of complicated grief and post-traumatic 
stress disorder illuminate, the hyponarrativity of the DSM-5’s disorder categories limits its 
usefulness in identifying and therefore treating some disorders. In particular, we have shown that 
the development of effective psychotherapeutic treatments for the complicated grief and post-
traumatic stress disorder requires special attention to the social, cultural and self-related features 
of these disorders.  
 There is no scarcity of protest against the DSMs in scholarship, and we do not intend to 
add to this protest. Identifying the limitations of the DSM-5 stemming from hyponarrativity 
opens the door for recommendations that amplify the strengths of the DSM-5 at the same time as 
remedying these limitations. 
 First, medical practitioners in general must be careful to place the DSM-5’s 
operationalized disorder categories into the larger context of a patient’s life. They must recognize 
that individuals, even those with mental disorder, are cognitively complex, meaning making 
beings, who respond, for better or for worse, to the language and narratives in which they are 
situated. As we demonstrate in the examples of grief and post-traumatic stress disorder, the 
narrative elements of an individual’s life influence her mental disorder experience and are 
sometimes the key elements of her life that psychotherapy aims to repair.  While psychologists 
and psychiatrists are well-trained in contextual interviewing and the complexities of mental 
disorders, family practice physicians, nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants may lack 
such training absent a specific focus in psychiatry. This is an important lacuna in the integration 
of psychiatric care with health care, as the latter set of medical practitioners serve on the front 
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lines of identifying patients with symptom clusters of mental disorder for referral to psychiatric 
specialists and many may lack the training necessary to use the DSM-5 in a resourceful way.  
 Second, the larger community of psychiatric practitioners must advocate for more time 
with patients, time during which more complex patient histories can be gathered and the 
narrative contexts of mental disorder can be explored in relation to the DSM disorder categories. 
This will draw on the strengths of the DSM-5 as a research tool for the classification and study of 
mental disorders while at the same time allow for more complex and nuanced use of disorder 
categories in the diagnosis and treatment of individuals with mental disorders.  
 Third, mental health professionals must continue to initiate and remain in important 
dialogues of inquiry not only with neuroscientists and geneticists, but also anthropologists, social 
workers, historians, psychologists, and philosophers. The DSM is a research and clinical tool 
whose influence extends beyond the bounds of the psychiatric profession itself. It is used in 
research in cognitive science, social theory, philosophy and area studies such as feminist theory, 
critical race theory and disability studies. The writers of the DSM and psychiatric professionals 
generally ought to remain in dialogue with researchers in these fields, and where dialogue is 
strained, researchers must work together to investigate, from multiple angles and scientific 
methodologies, shared points of inquiry.lxxvii   
 Finally, more emphasis must be given on the development of professional virtues for 
mental health practitioners. Some of these virtues include, trustworthiness, humble propriety, 
gender sensitive virtues, empathy (and compassion), warmth, self-knowledge, emotional 
intelligence, and integrity, hopeful patience, and perseverance, respect for the patient and for the 
healing project, moral integrity, sincerity and wholeheartedness.lxxviii 
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 There is scientific, psychological and social power in the naming and description of 
psychological disorders and individual responses to these.lxxix Psychiatric taxonomy is not just a 
project of ‘carving the nature at its joints,’ but also an ethical project of identifying the ways in 
which mental health care can best contribute to the flourishing of individuals with mental 
disorders. Psychiatric professionals must thus cultivate awareness of the DSM’s power and its 
potential effects on research, patient mental health and the perception of mental disorder by 
patients and their communities. Included in this should be a concern for the first-person stories, 
narratives, and memoirs that address the self-related and context specific factors of individuals’ 
experience with mental disorder and their therapeutic recovery. These are some of the important 
elements that contribute to the success of psychotherapeutic recovery for patients and factors that 
will aid practitioners in their own clinical development as well as the development of effective 
therapies for patients. These are also important resources that must be used as educational tools 
in medical schools and psychiatric residency and training programs. 
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